We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities.
Introduction
Cooperative game theory provides tools to study situations in which the coalitions are the main actors. In a cooperative game the details of the underlying interaction among players are omitted to build a robust model. The focus is on what coalitions will emerge and how to share the benefits of the cooperation. Even if these games are as old as game theory itself 1 their applications to economics have not been as successful as the ones of their non-cooperative counterpart (Maskin, 2016) . The fact that, traditionally externalities have been overlooked in the literature may be a reason. Indeed, externalities are present in most economic examples where coalitions are the fundamental elements. For instance, when firms merge in a cartel or after a takeover bid, the expected profit will depend on the potential merging carried out by the rest of firms in the market. Jelnov and Tauman (2009) use games with externalities to study the coalition formation in a Cournot market where there is a patent holder. Thrall and Lucas (1963) introduced games in partition function form to describe situations in which coalitions generate externalities on one another. In this model, the main ingredient are not just coalitions but embedded coalitions, that consist of a coalition and a partition of the rest of agents. In this way, a coalition can have different values depending on what partition it is embedded in. More recently, many important contributions have been published, most of them focusing on the problem of how to share the benefits of the cooperation. For instance, Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) , de Clippel and Serrano (2008) , McQuillin (2009) , and Dutta et al. (2010) address the issue of how to extend the Shapley value and Kóczy (2007) and Bloch and van den Nouweland (2014) propose generalizations of the core to games with externalities. Fewer papers have explored the properties of the game itself. Hafalir (2007) notes that extending the classic properties of superadditivity and convexity is not a trivial task. He shows that superadditivity, as defined by Maskin (2003) is not a sufficient condition for the efficiency of the grand coalition in situations with negative externalities. Abe (2016) proposes alternative definitions of superadditivity that do the work when externalities are either positive or negative. Hafalir (2007) also introduced a notion of convexity that guarantees that the grand coalition is the most efficient configuration. With a different purpose Abe (2019) introduced another notion of convexity, logically independent to the previous one. A different branch of the literature follows a non-cooperative approach to study situations with coalitional externalities. For instance, Ray and Vohra (1999) use an extensive form bargaining game to find out the coalition structures that are likely to arise.
Here, we rely on a partial order among embedded coalitions implicitly defined by de Clippel and Serrano (2008) . Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) analyze the set of embedded coalitions endowed with this partial order and show that it has a lattice structure. Then, it is very natural to interpret the supremum and the infimum of two embedded coalitions as their union and intersection, respectively. The supremum is obtained taking the union of the coalitions and the intersection of the partitions, more precisely their infimum in the lattice of partitions of a finite set. That is, the two coalitions whose worth is being evaluated are merged while the rest of agents form the partition obtained by keeping the divisions of the two original partitions.
The infimum works just the other way around, intersection of coalitions and union of partitions, which results in only keeping the divisions in which the two partitions agree. These operations allow us to generalize the classic definitions of superadditivity and convexity to games with externalities in a natural way.
To start with, we see that our properties imply the superadditivity proposed by Maskin (2003) and the convexity studied by Hafalir (2007) . Our main result is the characterization of convexity through a condition that requires the contributions to embedded coalitions to be non decreasing with respect to size. To define what is a contribution to an embedded coalition in a game with externalities we use the lattice structure again. Alonso-Meijide et al. (2019) introduce these contributions to build a super family of Shapley values that contains the ones proposed in the previous references. Some intermediate results that we use are interesting on their own. For instance, we show that a convex game can only have negative externalities. Which means that coalitions' worth decrease when the partition of the complement becomes coarser. Finally, we also obtain some interesting implications of our property with respect to certain core notions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some discrete mathematical terms that we will employ. Then, the partial order among embedded coalitions in which we ground our results is introduced. Finally, we revise some of the results of Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) to adapt them to our framework. In Section 3 we introduce our notions of essential, superadditive, and convex game with externalities and discuss their implications. Next, we present some interesting lemmata followed by our main result. Section 4 concludes with some additional results on the cores of convex games with externalities. The proof of the main result is relegated to the Appendix.
A lattice of embedded coalitions
Let (L, ≤) be a partially ordered set, with L being a finite set and x, y ∈ L. 2 The supremum, denoted by x ∨ y, is the unique element of L such that x, y ≤ x ∨ y and
then z ≤ x ∧ y. 3 A finite lattice is a finite partially ordered set in which every pair of elements have supremum and infimum. From now on, we assume that (L, ≤) is a finite lattice. The top, denoted by1, is the element of L such that x ≤1 for every
x ∈ L. Similarly, the bottom, denoted by0, is the element of L such that0 ≤ x for every x ∈ L.
A key notion for our paper is the covering relation. We say that x is covered by y or y covers x if x < y and there is no z ∈ L such that x < z < y. A chain C (between x 0 and x k ) is an ordered subset of L, C = {x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k } such that x l+1 covers x l , for every l = 0, . . . , k − 1. If x ≤ y, we denote by [x, y] L the set of elements z ∈ L such that x ≤ z ≤ y. If no confusion arises, we may just write [x, y] . Notice that [x, y] is also a lattice. A lattice satisfies the Jordan-Dedekind condition if all chains between a pair of elements have the same length. The height of x ∈ L is the length of the chains between the bottom element and x. The height of the lattice is the length of every chain that joins the bottom and the top elements. We say that
for every x, y, z ∈ L. (L, ≤) is lower semimodular if whenever x ∨ y covers both x and y, then both x and y cover x ∧ y, for every x, y ∈ L. (L, ≤) is semimodular or upper semimodular if whenever both x and y cover x ∧ y, then x ∨ y covers both x and y, for every x, y ∈ L.
The classic notion of convexity (Shapley, 1971) is the supermodularity of the characteristic function, which is a real function on the Boolean lattice of subsets. In general, a real function on (L, ≤), f , is said to be supermodular (submodular) if for
Let N be a finite set, n = |N |, S ⊆ N , and i ∈ N . We denote S ∪ {i} by S ∪ i and S \ {i} by S \ i. The family of partitions of N is denoted by Π(N ). Let, P ∈ Π(N ). We denote by |P | the number of non-empty elements of P , called blocks.
The partition P −S of N \ S is given by {T \ S : T ∈ P }. The partition of singletons of S, {{i} : i ∈ S}, is denoted by S and the partition of S in one block, {S}, is denoted by S . If P ∈ Π(N \ i), we also denote {{i}} ∪ P by {i} ∪ P . A well-known partial order on Π(N ) is the following: P Q if and only if for every S ∈ P there is some T ∈ Q such that S ⊆ T.
It is known that (Π(N ), ) is a semimodular lattice. The height of an element, P ∈ Π(N ) is given by r(P ) = n − |P |. If P, Q ∈ Π(N ), we denote by P Q the infimum of P and Q; the supremum of P and Q is denoted by P Q.
An embedded coalition of N is a pair (S; P ) with S ⊆ N and P ∈ Π(N \ S), i.e., {S} ∪ P ∈ Π(N ). In particular, (∅; P ) with P ∈ Π(N ) is also an (empty) embedded coalition. If all agents form the grand coalition we write (N ; ∅). That is, we consider that ∅ is the only partition in Π(∅). For simplicity we denote by (2)
Sometimes it will be convenient to use this formulation.
In the remainder of this section we describe some properties of the algebraic structure EC N , .
Proposition 2.1. Let (S; P ), (T ; Q) ∈ EC N . Then,
Proof.
1. The first item can be proven in the same way as Item 1 
Second, let us assume that |P | > 1 and take P = {P 1 , . . . , P m }, with m ≥ 2.
Then, we can have |S| = 0 or |S| > 0. If |S| = 0, then (S; P ) only covers embedded coalitions of type ∅; P −P j ∪P l ∪ P j ∪ P l for every j, l ∈ {1, . . . , m} with j = l and there is a chain of length k − 1 from the bottom element to (∅; P −P j ∪P l ∪ P j ∪ P l ).
By induction, all chains from the bottom element to
Finally, if |S| > 0, (S; P ) covers embedded coalitions of two types, (S \i; P ∪{i}), for every i ∈ S and (S; P −P j ∪P l ∪ P j ∪ P l ) for every j, l ∈ {1, . . . , m} with j = l. Using the induction hypothesis as before for each of the types of embedded coalitions we obtain that k = h(S; P ) = |P | + 2|S| − 1.
To conclude, take (S; P ) (T ; Q). Notice that any chain joining (T ; Q) and (S; P ) can be completed with a chain that joins (S; P ) with the bottom element.
Since all chains that start at the bottom element have the same length, the chains from (T ; Q) to (S; P ) also have a common length.
Then, the height of the lattice is h(N ; ∅) = 2n − 1. Notice that the height of every embedded coalition (S; P ) ∈ EC N can be described by means of the height of S in the Boolean lattice, |S|, and the height of P ∪ S in the partition lattice, r(P ∪ S ) as follows:
Since (Π(N ), ) is a graded and semimodular lattice, the height is a submodular function. This fact and Equation (3) are used to prove the following result.
). Using Equation (3),
Using the fact that the height of an element on the the partition lattice is a submodular function and taking P ∪ S , Q ∪ T ∈ Π(N ), we obtain
and the result follows.
As a consequence of Proposition 2.3 EC N , is a lower semimodular lattice.
Superadditiviy and convexity
In this section, we extend some of the most important properties of classic games to situations with coalitional externalities. Let N be a finite set. A game (with externalities) with player set N is defined by a partition function v : EC N −→ R such that v(∅; P ) = 0, for every P ∈ Π(N ). We denote by G N the class of all games with player set N . Any partition function v satisfying v(S; P ) = v(S; Q), for every S ⊆ N and P, Q ∈ Π(N \ S) is called a classic game. To begin with, we introduce the notion of superadditive game with externalities inspired by the inclusion relation studied in Section 2.
That is, for every pair of embedded coalitions whose intersection is an empty one, the worth of their supremum in (EC N , ) is greater or equal to the joint worths of the two embedded coalitions. Recall that (S;
In other words, if we evaluate the worths of two disjoint coalitions, each embedded in an arbitrary partition, this amount is weakly less than the worth of the union of the two coalitions embedded in the partition obtained by keeping all the divisions in the original partitions. 
An important property of a game with externalities is the efficiency of the grand coalition. Let v ∈ G N . We say that v is efficient for the grand coalition if for every
It is easy to check that if a game is superadditive, then it is also efficient for the grand coalition. Hafalir (2007) points out that this fact does not happen with Maskin's definition of superaditivity (Maskin, 2003) :
It is clear that any superadditive game in our sense is also a superadditive game in Maskin's sense, but the reverse does not hold.
Then, it is easy to check that v is superadditive in Maskin's sense. However, it is not superadditive according to Definition 3.1 as we can see taking (S; P ) = ({2}; 1, 3 )
and (T ; Q) = ({1}; 2, 3 ).
Next, we formulate our notion of convexity for games with externalities as the supermodularity of a function on the lattice EC N , .
That is, for every pair of embedded coalitions, the sum of their worths is less than or equal to the sum of the worths of their supremum and infimum in EC N , . It is a very natural generalization of the classic definition (Shapley, 1971) if the supremum and infimum in EC N , are understood as the union and intersection of embedded coalitions, respectively. As it happens when there are no externalities, any convex game is a superadditive game. In the literature there are several definitions of convexity for games with externalities. An important conceptual difference of our property is the fact that it applies to coalitions which are embedded in potentially different partitions. In a sense, we evaluate worths of coalitions that have different expectations about the organization of the complementary coalition.
Let us review the convexity notion of Hafalir (2007) and analyze its relationship
for every S, T ⊆ N and P ∈ Π(N \ (S ∪ T )). Notice that for every S, T ⊆ N and
. This implies that our convexity implies Hafalir convexity. In the example below we show that the reverse implication does not hold. In order to present our main result we first have to generalize the contribution of an agent to a coalition to environments with externalities. 5 To that end, we use the lattice studied in Section 2. In classic games the contributions correspond to a link in the Boolean lattice of subsets 2 N , ⊆ . Then, we consider that each link in the lattice EC N , corresponds to a contribution to the embedded coalition on the top. Note that this leads to two kinds of contributions. The first is the movement of a player from being a singleton in the partition to join the coalition. The second is the movement of a block in the partition that splits in two. Next, we present these contributions that were introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2019) and define what it means for a game to have non-decreasing contributions.
Let v ∈ G N and (S; P ) ∈ EC N such that {i} ∈ P for some i ∈ N . Then, we call
for every i ∈ N , (S; P ), (T ; Q) ∈ EC N with (S; P ) (T ; Q) = (N ; ∅) and {i} ∈ P .
Let v ∈ G N , (S; P ) ∈ EC N , and P ∈ Π(N \S) covering P . Then, we call external contribution to the difference v(S; P ) − v(S; P ). 6 Moreover, we say that external
for every (S; P ), (T ; Q) ∈ EC N such that (S; P ) (T ; Q) = (N ; ∅), P ∈ Π(N \ S) covering P , Q ∈ Π(N \ T ) covering Q, and (S; P ) (T ; Q ).
We state some auxiliary results that will be used to prove Theorem 3.1. That is, a game in which the external contributions are non-decreasing exhibits a monotonicity property in the sense that the worth of a coalition grows as the coalitions in the complement get more divided. In other words, it is a game with negative externalities (Hafalir, 2007) .
Lemma 3.2. Let v ∈ G N such that the external contributions are non-decreasing.
for every (T ; P ), (T ; Q) ∈ EC N .
That is, for a fixed coalition T the partition function of a game with nondecreasing external contributions is a supermodular function on Π(N \ T ).
for every S ⊆ T and P, Q ∈ Π(N \ T ), with Q P .
The above result states that when agents' contributions are non-decreasing in a game, the incorporation of several agents that were singletons in the partition is more beneficial for larger embedded coalitions. 
for every S, T ⊆ N and P ∈ Π(N \ (S ∪ T )).
Notice that Equation (10) is very similar to Hafalir convexity. The only difference is the fact that here we consider that agents who only participate in one of the two coalitions are singletons.
We are now ready to present our main result, which is a characterization of convexity by non-decreasing contributions. That is, we generalize the characterization of classic convex games by Shapley (1971) to environments with externalities.
Theorem 3.1. Let v ∈ G N . The following three items are equivalent.
i) v is a convex game.
ii) Let (S; P ), (T ; Q) ∈ EC N \ {(N ; ∅)} such that (T ; Q) covers (S; P ). Then,
2. For every P ∈ Π(N \ S) covering P and Q ∈ Π(N \ T ) covering Q such
iii) v has non-decreasing agents' and external contributions.
Proof. First, we proof that i) implies ii). (6) and (7) hold because v satisfies Inequalities (11) and (12). In the following, we assume that h(T ; Q) − h(S; P ) > 1. We divide the proof in two parts, the first to check Inequality (6) and the second to check Inequality (7). Figure 1 illustrates the scheme of the proof of the first part. Let us assume that h(T ; Q) − h(S; P ) = k > 1.
If there is some {i} ∈ P , then {i} ∈ Q. Take a chain T \ S ∪ Q = Q 0 ≺ Q 1 ≺ . . . ≺ Q m = P with m > 1 in the lattice of partitions (Π(N ), ). Notice that {i} ∈ Q j , for every j = 0, . . . , m. Note also that for every j = 0, . . . , m − 1, (S; Q j ) covers (S; Q j+1 ). Then, we can apply Inequality (11) to (S; Q j+1 ) and
If T \S = ∅, Inequality (13) is Inequality (6) and the proof is finished. If T \S = ∅, let us assume that T \ S = {i 1 , . . . , i r } and take R j = {i 1 , . . . , i j }, for every j = 1, . . . , r
. We apply Inequality (11) 
Adding up these r inequalities, we get
Adding up Inequalities (13) and (14), and rearranging terms, we obtain
Then, Inequality (6) holds.
We check that Inequality (7) also holds. Figure 2 illustrates the scheme of the proof. Let P be a partition that covers P in (Π(N \ S), ), Q be a partition that covers Q in (Π(N \ T ), ), such that (S; P ) (T ; Q ). Take a pair of chains 
in the lattice of partitions (Π(N ), ), such that Q j covers Q j , for every j = 0, . . . , m with m > 1. Notice that both chains have the same length because P covers P , Q covers Q, Q ≺ P −T , and Q ≺ P −T . For every j = 0, . . . , m, (S; Q j ) covers (S; Q j ).
Then we apply Inequality (12) 
If T \ S = ∅, we finish the proof. If T \ S = ∅, we proceed as we did above in order to obtain Inequality (14) (23)
III Apply Lemma 3.4 to S, T , and
Adding up Inequalities (19), (21), and (22), we obtain
Adding up Inequalities (17), (20), and (25), we obtain
Adding up Inequalities (18), (23), and (24), we obtain
Finally, adding up Inequalities (26), (27), and (28), we obtain v S ∪ T ;
Summarizing all the previous results, we have the characterization of convexity for games with externalities given in Theorem 3.1.
Observe that condition ii) is a weakening of iii) as it is only applied when the embedded coalition (T ; Q) covers (S; P ), in point 2. it is also required that (T ; Q ) covers (S; P ). This is parallel to the characterization of classic convex games where it is sufficient to check that the contributions are non-decreasing when one player is incorporated to the coalition. Hafalir (2007) also considered a weakening of his notion of convexity, which is obtained by requiring Inequality (10) only when |T \S| = |S \ T | = 1. However, as he points out, this condition alone is not even sufficient for the efficiency of the grand coalition. Abe (2016) shows that for games with negative externalities, the weak version of Hafalir convexity is sufficient. From Theorem 3.1
we can also conclude that it is enough to check that contributions are non-decreasing to coalitions that are just one link away from one another to guarantee that the grand coalition is efficient.
Convexity and the core
In this section we include some comments on the core of the optimistic and the pessimistic games 7 associated to a convex game. Both of them are classic games.
First we recall the notion of the core of a classic game. Let w ∈ G N be a classic game. The core of w is given by
In general, Core(w) can be empty, but every convex classic game has a non-empty core. Besides, it is quite easy to describe its extreme points. Let the set of per-7 Which are essentially the α-core and β-core (Hart and Kurz, 1983) . More recently Dutta et al. (2010) , Bloch and van den Nouweland (2014) , and Abe (2016) also use these games. . Then, Core(v max ) ⊆ Core(v min ). Abe (2016) proved that if v has negative externalities and satisfies the weak convexity condition, then Core(v max ) is non-empty as well as Core(v min ). Since a convex game according to Definition 3.2 satisfies the weak convexity condition, we already known that both Core(v max ) and Core(v min ) are non-empty sets when v is a convex game. Notice that v P is defined for every S ⊆ N even if S is not a block in P . Besides, v P (S) = v Q (S), for every P, Q ∈ Π(N ) and S ⊆ N with P −S = Q −S . The optimistic game can then be defined by v max (S) = max{v P (S) : P ∈ Π(N )}, analogously for the pessimistic game by v min (S) = min{v P (S) : P ∈ Π(N )}, for every S ⊆ N .
Proof. Let x ∈ Core(v max ) and P ∈ Π(N ). Then,
Then, x ∈ Core v P . Let x ∈ P ∈Π(N )
Core v P . Let (S, Q) ∈ EC N be such that v max (S) = v(S; Q). Take, for instance, P = Q ∪ S . It is clear that P −S = Q and v P (S) = v(S; Q) = v max (S). Since x ∈ Core v P , we have i∈S
Thus, x ∈ Core(v max ).
Next, we characterize the extreme points of the core of v max and the core of v min of a convex game. 3. v max is a convex classic game and
. Let
x ∈ Core v Q , then
where the first inequality follows because x ∈ Core(v Q ) and the second inequality because (S; P −S ) (S; Q −S ) and Lemma 3.1 holds. Then, x ∈ Core(v P ). 
Let

First, we see that
Notice that {i} ∈ N −S and (S; N \ S ) (T ; N \ T ) = (N ; ∅). According
. Thus, Inequality (29) holds and v N is a convex game.
As a consequence of Theorem 4.1, if v is convex the Externality-free value (de Clippel and Serrano, 2008) is the average of the extreme points of the core of v max and it also belongs to the core of v min . Notice that our definition of convexity is not enough to guarantee the convexity of the classic game v min . We illustrate this using 
Final remarks
Finally, we compare our definition of superadditivy with optimistic superadditivity (optimistic-SA) as defined by Abe (2016) . A game v ∈ G N is optimisticsuperadditive if v max is a superadditive classic game. It is clear that any convex game according to Definition 3.2 is also optimistic-superadditive as a consequence of Theorem 4.1. Nevertheless, there are games with negative externalities that are optimistic-superadditive but not superadditive according to Definition 3.1. We illustrate this with the following example. Applying Inequality (7) 
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Take S ⊆ T , P, Q ∈ Π(N \ T ) with Q P . We proceed by induction on |T \ S|. If |T \ S| = 0, Inequality (9) 
Notice that S ⊆ T \ i. Take P = {i} ∪ P , and Q = {i} ∪ Q. Since |T \ (S ∪ i)| = k − 1 < k, {i} ∈ P , and Q P , applying the induction hypothesis we get
Adding up Inequalities (30) and (31) Then, let us assume that S and T are not comparable and S \ T = {i 1 , . . . , i r }. Let A 0 = S ∩ T and B 0 = T . For each j = 1, . . . , r, take
For every j = 0, . . . , r, we have (A j ; P j ) (B j ; Q j ). Thus, for every j = 0, . . . , r − 1, applying Inequality (6) to i j+1 , (A j ; P j ) and (B j ; Q j ), we obtain v(B j ∪{i j+1 };
. Adding up these r inequalities, we get
concluding the proof. 
with r ≥ 1, be a chain that joins P Q and Q. Notice that P j and Q l are not comparable for every j = 1, . . . , k + 1, l = 1, . . . , r + 1. We distinguish four cases. 1. Then, P Q covers P , Q covers P Q, but P does not cover P Q and P = P Q. Figure 6 illustrates the situation. Take a chain P Q = P 0 ≺ P 1 ≺ . . . ≺ P k ≺ P k+1 = P , with k ≥ 1. Notice that Q ≺ Q P 1 ≺ . . . ≺ Q P k ≺ Q P k+1 = Q P , with k ≥ 1 is a chain from Q to P Q. Let j ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Then, P j Q = P Q and using Proposition 2.3 we have 1 = h T ; P Q −h(T ; Q) = h T ; P j Q −h(T ; Q) ≥ h(T ; P j )−h T ; P j Q .
Since P j = P j Q, h(T ; P j ) − h(T ; P j Q) = 1. Besides, (P j Q) P j+1 = P j .
Using that (Π(N ), ) is semimodular, (P j Q) P j+1 = P j+1 Q covers both P j Q and P j+1 . Then, using Item 1, we have v(T ; P j ) + v T ; P j+1 Q ≥ v(T ; P j+1 ) + v T ; P j Q .
Summing up the inequalities given above, we get k j=0 v(T ; P j ) + v T ; P j+1 Q ≥ k j=0 v(T ; P j+1 ) + v T ; P j Q .
Rearranging this inequality, we obtain Inequality (8). 3. h(T ; P )−h(T ; P Q) = 1, but h(T ; P Q)−h(T ; Q) > 1. This means P Q covers P , but Q does not cover P Q. Figure 7 illustrates the situation. Since h(T ; Q) ≥ h(T ; P ) and h(T ; P Q) − h(T ; Q) > 1, we have h(T ; P Q) − h(T ; P ) > 1. Take P Q = P 0 ≺ Q 1 ≺ . . . ≺ Q r ≺ Q r+1 = Q, with r ≥ 1, a chain that joins P Q and Q. By the choice of Q 1 , we have • (T ; Q 1 ) (T ; P Q), (T ; P ) (T ; P Q), h(T ; P Q) − h(T ; Q 1 ) = 1 , and the fact that (T ; P ) and (T ; Q 1 ) are not comparable imply that (T ; P Q) = (T ; P Q 1 ).
• (T ; P Q) (T ; P Q 1 ) (T ; P ) and h(T ; P ) − h(T ; P Q) = 1. Then, P = P Q 1 or P Q 1 = P Q. If P = P Q 1 we have Q 1 P and (T ; P ) (T ; Q 1 ), but this fact contradicts that (T ; P ) and (T ; Q 1 ) are not comparable. Then, (T ; P Q) = (T ; P Q 1 ).
As a consequence of all this, applying Item 2 to (T ; P ) and (T ; Q 1 ), we obtain v T ; P Q + v T ; P Q ≥ v(T ; P ) + v(T ; Q 1 )
Since v satisfies Inequality (7) Take (T ; Q) and (T ; P ) with h(T ; P ) − h(T ; P Q) = l. Take P Q = P 0 ≺ P 1 ≺ . . . ≺ P k ≺ P k+1 = P , with k ≥ 1, a chain that joins P Q and P and P Q = Q 0 ≺ Q 1 ≺ . . . ≺ Q r ≺ Q r+1 = Q, with r ≥ 1, a chain that joins P Q and Q. Applying Item 1 to (T ; P 1 )) and (T ; Q 1 ) because (T ; P 1 ) ∨ (T ; Q 1 ) = (T ; P Q), h(T ; P Q) − h(T ; P 1 ) = 1 = h(T ; P Q) − h(T ; Q 1 ), we get v T ; P Q + v T ; P 1 Q 1 ≥ v(T ; P 1 ) + v(T ; Q 1 )
Due to the choice of P 1 and Q 1 , we have (T ; Q) ∨ (T ; P 1 Q 1 ) = (T ; Q 1 ), h(T ; Q 1 ) − h(T ; P 1 Q 1 ) = 1, and h(T ; Q 1 ) − h(T ; Q) ≥ 1. Then, applying Item 1 if h(T ; Q 1 ) − h(T ; Q) = 1 and applying Item 2 if h(T ; Q 1 ) − h(T ; Q) > 1 we get v(T ; Q 1 ) + v T ; P 1 Q ≥ v(T ; Q) + v T ; P 1 Q 1 .
In a similar way if we take (T ; P ) and (T ; P 1 Q 1 ), we get v(T ; P 1 ) + v T ; P Q 1 ≥ v(T ; P ) + v T ; P 1 Q 1 .
Finally, we take (T ; P 1 Q) and (T ; P Q 1 ). Then, (T ; P 1 Q) ∧ (T ; P Q 1 ) = (T ; P Q) and (T ; P Q 1 ) ∨ (T ; P 1 Q) (T ; P 1 Q 1 ). Besides, h(T ; P Q 1 ) − h(T ; P Q) = l − 1 < l. We apply the induction hypothesis and obtain v T ; P Q 1 ∨ T ; P 1 Q +v T ; P Q ≥ v T ; P Q 1 +v T ; P 1 Q .
Adding up Inequalities ( 
